Given my previous post on the relationship between remembering and truth, there are some interesting offshoots. Let’s look at an example. Suppose we have a duplicator machine that, well, makes duplicates of anything you want. Let’s say we have Saul Kripke stand in the place where the model is supposed to be and the duplicator machine duplicates Kripke. Call the model Kripke(1) and the duplicate Kripke(2). Suppose Kripke(1) and Kripke(2) wander off and we lose track of them. Later on, we find them both and put them in an interrogation room. Assume that they have not forgotten anything in the meantime. Is there anyway to tell which one is Kripke(1) and which one is Kripke(2)? In fact, a simple way is related to remembering things. So we administer truth serum to them that makes them tell the truth 100% of the time. Now, since a necessary condition of remembering something is that the thing is true, we can ask the following question: do you remember being the model for the duplicator machine? Only Kripke(1) can answer in the affirmative and so we have discovered which person is Kripke(1) and which person is Kripke(2).

# Remembering and Duplication

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Would this imply that Kripke(2) has the neural correlates and synapse structures that come with the memory of being the model, but not the actual memory?

Your point hinges on the requirement that a memory is true. Couldn’t someone who was administered a truth serum think he is telling the truth, when in fact, it is a false memory?

Right. So I ended up re-titling this because something struck me. Namely, we can still have a memory, but it might not be remembering. People might think those are one and the same, but my previous post on remembering seems to show they are not. So remembering seems to be a true memory.

Given that, yes, he can still have the same neural correlates and whatnot and so he would have the memory, but it wouldn’t be remembering.

I’m here stipulating that a truth serum makes them tell the truth, no matter what. Maybe that’s impossible in real life, but that’s a stipulating of the thought experiment. Hence, if we asked Kripke(1) and Kripke(2) if they had some memory of riding a bike at age 7, then they both can answer the same. However, if we ask them if they remember that (stipulating that Kripke(1) did, in fact, ride a bike at age 7), then they cannot answer the same since it is only true that one of them remembers that because only one of them rode a bike at age 7.